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BLACKOUT OR BLACKMAIL? 
HOW GARBER V. MLB WILL SHED LIGHT 
ON MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S 
BROADCASTING CARTEL 
INTRODUCTION 
Baseball fans across North America are all too familiar with seeing 
the same message displayed across the screen of their TV, computer, 
tablet, or other electronic device: “We’re sorry, this game is not 
available in your area.”1 Even Bud Selig, Major League Baseball’s 
longtime commissioner, is not impervious to antiquated and complicated 
blackout policies that leave millions of baseball fans in the dark while 
league executives, teams, and media outlets continue to bring in billions 
of dollars in revenue.2 Major League Baseball (MLB or the League) and 
its member teams can continue to drive up the cost for consumers and 
prevent fans from watching their favorite teams through anticompetitive, 
exclusive broadcasting license agreements because baseball is in the 
unique position of being exempt from antitrust law.3 
In 1922, the Supreme Court held in its landmark ruling, Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base 
Ball Clubs, that professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust 
law.4 Nearly a century later, the exemption still stands, largely 
unchanged, despite Justice Douglas referring to it as “derelict in the 
stream of the law,”5 and Justice Clark stating it “at best was of dubious 
validity . . . , unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical.”6 As the broad 
exemption has continued to be upheld by the Supreme Court and various 
lower courts, so has the League’s ability to limit the broadcasting of live 
games.7 However, more recent jurisprudence in American Needle v. NFL 
on the application of antitrust law to professional sports has put this 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. Dylan McLemore, Sports Blackout Rules Don’t Fit Internet Age, 
DYLANMCLEMORE.COM (Jun. 25, 2012), http://dylanmclemore.com/2012/06/25/sports-
blackout-rules-dont-fit-internet-age/. 
 2. Jeff Passan, Selig’s Promise, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 11, 2006), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-blackouts071106 [hereinafter Passan, Selig’s 
Promise] (At a 2006 luncheon with the Baseball Writers Association of America, Selig 
responded to a question about blackout policies by stating, “I don’t understand (blackouts) 
myself . . . . I get blacked out from some games . . . . I don’t know what to do about it. We’ll 
figure it out.”). 
 3. See J. Gordon Hylton, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 391 (1999). 
 4. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
208 (1922). 
 5. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 6. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450, 452 (1957). 
 7. Jeff Passan, MLB’s Blackout Problem Keeps Sport in Dark Ages, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Jun. 22, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/mlb%E2%80%99s-blackout-
problem-keeps-sport-in-dark-ages.html [hereinafter Passan, Blackout Problem]. 
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antitrust exemption in jeopardy.8 As a result, four fans are taking on the 
League to challenge these non-competitive agreements in Garber v. 
MLB.9 
This Note contends that the Southern District of New York should 
rule in favor of the Garber plaintiffs in their suit against MLB and 
should hold that the League’s broadcasting policies unreasonably 
restrain trade. Part I explores the legal precedent and history of MLB’s 
antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball, including the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in American Needle. Part II describes how the 
various baseball broadcasting agreements for in- and out-of-market 
games operate. Part III argues that the Garber plaintiffs should prevail 
in their suit against the League because the court should apply American 
Needle to MLB and its member clubs, overturn professional baseball’s 
antitrust exemption, and hold that the League’s noncompetitive 
broadcasting policies unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. Finally, Part IV proposes steps that the League 
can take in future broadcasting procedures, whether or not the Garber 
plaintiffs are victorious in their suit, for the mutual benefit of the League 
and fans, as well as to maintain the competitive balance among the MLB 
clubs. 
I. HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
In order to properly understand the issues being raised in Garber, it 
is necessary to first examine the basis for MLB’s antitrust exemption 
and its scope under current law. This muddled history can be traced 
through two distinct periods: the creation and preservation of the 
exemption through its first fifty years from 1922 to 1972, and a 
narrowing of the exemption from 1972 to the present through various 
lower court decisions and federal legislation.10 
A. 1922–1972: CREATION AND PRESERVATION OF THE 
EXEMPTION 
In 1922, the Supreme Court created the League’s exemption from 
antitrust law in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League 
of Professional Base Ball Clubs.11 Although the first professional 
                                                                                                                                       
 8. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 9. Complaint, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of MLB, No. 12 Civ. 3704 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), 2012 WL 1609215 [hereinafter Garber Complaint]. 
 10. See Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework 
for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 557 (2010). 
 11. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
208 (1922). 
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baseball team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, played as early as 1869,12 
the League as we know it was not formed until 1903 when the 
independent American and National Leagues signed the “National 
Agreement” to work together in furtherance of the sport.13 
During these early stages of professional baseball, the American and 
National Leagues were challenged by rival independent leagues, which 
fought for players, fans, and business.14 Many of these smaller 
independent leagues, the most popular of which was the eight-team 
Federal League, were driven out of business by the more renowned 
American and National Leagues.15 In 1915, the American and National 
Leagues reached a settlement with the Federal League in which some 
Federal League owners would accept a buyout or be allowed to buy 
franchises in one of the two major leagues.16 
The publicly owned Baltimore Terrapins (the Baltfeds) opted out of 
this settlement,17 instead initiating the Federal Baseball lawsuit in 1917 
against the American and National Leagues.18 In that case, the plaintiffs 
alleged under section 4 of the Clayton Act19 that the defendants 
“conspir[ed] to destroy its franchise by monopolizing the baseball 
business and restraining trade therein.”20 In the brief opinion by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes—writing on behalf of a unanimous Court—the 
Supreme Court denied application of federal antitrust law to organized 
baseball on the grounds that it did not constitute commerce under the 
scope of congressional authority.21 The Court specifically stated that the 
                                                                                                                                       
 12. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption: Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 34 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 183, 185 (2009). 
 13. Id. at 186.  
 14. Id. at 185. 
 15. Id. at 186. 
 16. Id. at 189. 
 17. Id. As part of the settlement, the Baltfeds were only offered their “equitable 
distribution” of the Federal League’s value: a sum of $50,000—a disappointment compared 
to the Brooklyn franchise’s owner who received a $400,000 buyout. Id. In fact, transcripts 
from the settlement meeting imply that the Baltfeds did not even have a representative 
present, in part because  
 
[t]he major leagues did not need to eliminate every franchise in order to hobble their 
competitor. Moreover, the Baltimore market did not appeal to organized baseball, which 
had already left the market once in 1903. Charles Comiskey, owner of the White Sox, 
expressed the view that Baltimore was “a minor league city, and not a hell of a good one 
at that.”  
 
Id. (quoting Brief on Behalf of Defendants in Error at 155, Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. 
Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (No. 204)). 
 18. Id. at 190. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
 20. Alito, supra note 12, at 190. 
 21. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09. 
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“business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state 
affairs.”22 First, the Court reasoned that, because of the nature of 
baseball as a sporting event that is “personal effort, not related to 
production,” it could not be considered commerce.23 Second, even if 
baseball games did constitute commerce, according to the Court, 
transportation of players and equipment across state lines, as well as 
attendance of fans from out of state, were “a mere incident.”24 As stated 
more clearly by the Circuit Court, “[n]ot until [the players] come into 
contact with their opponents on the baseball field and the contest opens 
does the game come into existence. It is local in its beginning and in its 
end.”25 
By the time the Supreme Court reviewed baseball’s antitrust 
exemption again in Toolson v. New York Yankees26 thirty-one years 
later, the way baseball was presented to the public, as well as 
jurisprudence behind Federal Baseball, had changed significantly.27 
Through technological developments in the 1930s and 1940s, baseball 
games were now being broadcast across state lines using radio and 
television.28 Furthermore, in the decades following Federal Baseball, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the scope of congressional power had 
expanded drastically—the Court shifted away from the narrow concepts 
of interstate commerce in E. C. Knight29 and Hammer v. Dagenhart30 to 
its more expanded view in United States v. Darby31 and Wickard v. 
Filburn,32 which rejected the direct/indirect standard of commerce from 
Dagenhart.33 
                                                                                                                                       
 22. Id. at 208. 
 23. Id. at 209. 
 24. Id. at 208–09. 
 25. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 269 F. 681, 685 
(D.C. Cir. 1920). 
 26. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
 27. Hylton, supra note 3, at 395. 
 28. Id.; Kevin McDonald, Antitrust and Baseball: Stealing Holmes, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 
89, 90 (1998). 
 29. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that a sugar 
manufacturer did not violate the Sherman Act because manufacturing occurred before the 
goods entered the stream of commerce and, therefore, was only incidentally and indirectly 
related to commerce). 
 30. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding that a law barring child 
labor in factories was invalid because manufacturing has no direct effect on commerce and, 
therefore, cannot be regulated by Congress). 
 31. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941) (holding that some intrastate 
activities affect interstate commerce and can be regulated by Congress, overruling 
Dagenhart, and abandoning the “stream of commerce” argument). 
 32. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942) (holding that a farmer growing 
extra wheat for personal consumption would have a significant aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce and rejecting the direct/indirect test from Dagenhart). 
 33. See Hylton, supra note 3, at 395 (“[T]he 1922 United States Supreme Court decision 
which had held that baseball was not a form of interstate commerce, had been seriously 
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Nevertheless, in a one-paragraph, 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court 
found in Toolson that baseball’s antitrust exemption should be upheld.34 
First, the Court cited stare decisis as a ground for upholding the 
exemption.35 Because Congress had not done anything to alter the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball, “[t]he business has 
thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it 
was not subject to antitrust legislation.”36 The Toolson Court then held 
that, because over thirty years had passed since the Court’s decision in 
Federal Baseball, and no legislation was passed to remove the judicially 
created exemption (even though it was not enumerated in the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in the first place), “Congress had no intention of including 
the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”37 
This last section of the opinion is significant because it effectively 
changed the core of the Court’s holding in Federal Baseball.38 Instead of 
saying that baseball was not part of interstate commerce, and thus could 
not be regulated by Congress, the Toolson Court held that it was never 
the intent of Congress to regulate baseball through the Sherman Act at 
all.39 In fact, despite stating that the opinion was based almost 
completely on the opinion of Federal Baseball,40 the Court in 1922 did 
not discuss congressional intent at all, prompting one critic to call the 
Toolson opinion “the greatest bait-and-switch scheme in the history of 
the Supreme Court.”41 
In spite of the Supreme Court’s preservation of the exemption on 
completely different grounds, the Court continued to sustain organized 
baseball’s antitrust exemption over the next several decades.42 During 
this time, the Court considered four separate cases that discussed and 
solidified the antitrust exemption without involving organized baseball 
at all.43 In the 1955 case, United States v. Shubert, the Court considered 
an antitrust suit brought against a theater company and held that the 
Toolson decision was a “narrow application of the rule of stare 
decisis.”44 However, the Supreme Court did not just refuse to apply 
Toolson to non-sporting events.45 Over the next sixteen years the Court 
                                                                                                                                       
eroded by the Court’s expanded definition of interstate commerce in the 1930s and 1940s . . . 
.”). 
 34. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Hylton, supra note 3, at 397. 
 39. Grow, supra note 10, at 570. 
 40. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
 41. Grow, supra note 10, at 570–71. 
 42. Id. at 571–73. 
 43. Id. 
 44. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955). 
 45. Grow, supra note 10, at 571–73. 
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refused to extend the exemption to boxing,46 football,47 and basketball,48 
and thus continued to hold that it was only baseball that received this 
preferred status. In fact, despite stating in Radovich v. NFL that the 
Federal Baseball holding “at best was of dubious validity,” and was 
“unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,”49 the Court maintained its 
puzzling position and continued to uphold baseball’s antitrust status.50 
The last time the Supreme Court specifically addressed baseball’s 
exemption was in the 1972 case, Flood v. Kuhn.51 Curt Flood, an all-star 
outfielder who earned success while playing for the St. Louis Cardinals 
for twelve seasons, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969 
without any type of notice.52 Disappointed about the trade, he 
unsuccessfully appealed to the Commissioner of Baseball, arguing that 
he should be allowed to try and strike his own bargain with a major 
league team of his choosing as a free agent.53 Although today the ability 
for athletes to form their own contracts with teams as a free agent is 
commonplace, at that time baseball operated under the “reserve clause” 
system, where players’ rights were kept by the team with which they had 
been playing when their original contract expired.54 As a result, Flood 
brought a suit against the League, charging violations of federal antitrust 
law, civil rights statutes, and the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of 
involuntary servitude.55 
Following Justice Blackmun’s sweeping glorification of baseball in 
the opinion’s introduction,56 the Court fully conceded that 
“[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate 
commerce.”57 Nevertheless, the Court stubbornly upheld baseball’s 
exemption again by stating: 
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost 
two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when 
                                                                                                                                       
 46. United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 244 (1955). 
 47. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1957). 
 48. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205–06 (1971). 
 49. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450, 452. 
 50.  Id. at 453.  
 51. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 52. Id. at 265. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players’ Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 
245 (1956). 
 55. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265–66.  
 56. Justice Blackmun begins his opinion with a look back at the history of baseball, 
including information about the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, who had only one 
Cincinnatian on the roster and traveled over 11,000 miles that season. Id. at 260–62. He then 
goes on to list over eighty former players, reference works about sports such as Casey at the 
Bat, refer to baseball as the “national pastime,” and cite from the lower court’s opinion that 
“[t]he game is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there.” Id. at 260–67 
(citing Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 57. Id. at 282. 
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Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand 
for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly 
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively. . . . If there is 
any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic 
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this 
Court.58 
The crux of Justice Blackmun’s holding was that even though the 
precedent from Federal Baseball was an “anomaly” and an “aberration,” 
organized baseball had grown and flourished for so many decades 
because of its reliance on this antitrust exemption.59 As a result, the 
Court was concerned with retroactivity problems and believed that 
Congress would be the best forum to make any adjustments.60 
B. 1972–PRESENT: LOWER COURT LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF 
BASEBALL’S EXEMPTION 
Since the ruling came down in 1972, the Court’s decision in Flood 
has been highly criticized.61 As a result, the years following this 
decision were marked primarily by a rolling back of the scope of 
baseball’s exemption through judicial action and legislation.62 
The most notable area where baseball’s antitrust status began to 
decline was in regard to labor.63 The Flood decision not only raised 
awareness to the public about the reserve clause, but also ignited the 
players to take action.64 In 1975, players Andy Messersmith and Dave 
McNally argued that, under the reserve clause, they were free to 
negotiate their own contracts with other teams because neither of them 
had signed a contract during that year.65 Messersmith and McNally, 
supported by the MLB Players’ Association, were able to convince 
baseball’s arbitrator, Peter Seitz, that the reserve clause should be 
                                                                                                                                       
 58. Id. at 283–84. 
 59. Id. at 282–83. 
 60. Id. 
 61. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1381 
(1988) (“Flood v. Kuhn is an almost comical adherence to the strict rule against overruling 
statutory precedents, particularly considering that the Sherman Act has developed essentially 
through a common law process.”); David Greenberg, Baseball’s Con Game: How Did 
America’s Pastime Get an Antitrust Exemption?, SLATE (July 19, 2002, 10:36 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2002/07/baseballs_con_gam
e.html (“The opinion—for which Blackmun would long be ridiculed—included a juvenile, 
rhapsodic ode to the glories of the national pastime, sprinkled with comments about 
legendary ballplayers and references to the doggerel poem ‘Casey at the Bat.’”). 
 62. Grow, supra note 10, at 575–89.  
 63. Id. at 575–76.  
 64. Nick Acocella, Flood of Free Agency, ESPN CLASSIC, http://espn.go.com/classic 
/biography/s/flood_curt.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 65. Silver Anniversary: Baseball Salaries Have Skyrocketed Since 1975 Ruling, CNN 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 23, 2000, 2:38 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball 
/mlb/news/2000/12/22/free_agency_ap/. 
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overturned.66 The decision was upheld by the Eighth Circuit one year 
later, effectively ending the reserve clause system and allowing players 
to act as free agents when their contracts expired.67 
Over twenty years later, Congress finally took action by passing the 
Curt Flood Act of 1998 (the Curt Flood Act)68—one year after Flood’s 
death.69 Under this law, Congress reacted to Flood v. Kuhn and 
designated that, at least in the limited area of labor, baseball was not 
immune to antitrust laws.70 In doing so, Congress declared that 
employment of professional players is subject to antitrust law “to the 
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be 
subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other 
professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.”71 However, 
section 3 of the Curt Flood Act specifically limited these changes from 
affecting minor league players, the relationship between major and 
minor league teams, franchise expansion and relocation, ownership 
issues, broadcasting, and the employment of umpires.72 
This act of Congress has been interpreted many ways, with some 
seeing it as an endorsement of the Court’s precedent thus far on 
antitrust; others deem Congress’s actions as mere indifference.73 To 
make matters more confusing, the Curt Flood Act specifically says that 
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the application to 
organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption 
from the antitrust laws.”74 During deliberation over the bill in Congress, 
Senate co-sponsors Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy stated that the 
intention of the Act was “to have no effect other than to clarify the status 
of major league players under the antitrust laws. With regard to all other 
context or other persons or entities, the law will be the same after 
passage of the Act as it is today.”75 Therefore, the Act largely left the 
League’s antitrust exemption intact. 
                                                                                                                                       
 66. Id. 
 67. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615, 632 (8th Cir. 
1976). Although the court stated that “we intimate no views on the reserve clause system,” it 
deferred to the decision of the arbitrator, which effectively ended the use of the reserve 
clause. Id. 
 68. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)). 
 69. Acocella, supra note 64. 
 70. Grow, supra note 10, at 575–76. 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Grow, supra note 10, at 576. 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(d)(4). 
 75. Martin M. Tomlinson, The Commissioner’s New Clothes: The Myth of Major League 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 255, 287 (2008) (quoting 144 
CONG. REC. 18,459 (1998) (statements of Sens. Wellstone, Hatch & Leahy)). 
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During floor debate on the Curt Flood Act, Senator Paul Wellstone 
was concerned that passing the Act would have a chilling effect on 
decisions from lower courts, including then-pending litigation in the 
Senator’s home state of Minnesota, which held a more limited view of 
the antitrust exemption.76 Indeed, sixteen years before debate on the Curt 
Flood Act, a federal district court in Texas considered Henderson 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n.77 In that case, a local radio 
station that broadcasted baseball games for the Houston Astros sued the 
owner of the team.78 The station contended that, because the team 
cancelled their broadcasting contract and gave exclusive broadcasting 
rights to a competing station, it had violated the Sherman Act and state 
antitrust law.79 The franchise’s owner moved to dismiss the case on the 
basis of the antitrust exemption laid out in the Federal Baseball 
trilogy.80 The court denied the dismissal and instead relied on the narrow 
“unique characteristics and needs” standard that the Supreme Court 
articulated in Flood.81 The court went on to say: 
The fact that interstate broadcasting has on the one hand subjected 
other professional sports to the antitrust laws, but has not on the other 
hand affected the baseball exemption, is perplexing . . . . Radio 
broadcasting is not a part of the sport in the way in which players, 
umpires, the league structure and the reserve system are.82 
Ten years later, the Southern District of New York also interpreted 
the Supreme Court precedent in Flood as limiting the scope of the 
antitrust exemption solely to baseball’s “unique characteristics and 
needs.”83 However, lower courts have disagreed as to what aspects of 
baseball were included in this standard.84 
Notably, in 1993, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered 
the case Piazza v. MLB.85 Here, the League thwarted two Pennsylvania 
businessmen, as part of a larger partnership, in their attempt to buy the 
San Francisco Giants franchise for $115 million and relocate the team to 
a stadium in St. Petersburg, Florida.86 The League did not approve the 
                                                                                                                                       
 76. 144 CONG. REC. 18,459 (1998). 
 77. Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 
 78. Id. at 264–65. 
 79. Id. at 264. 
 80. Id. at 265. 
 81. Id. at 268–69. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 
407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)); see also Grow, supra note 10, at 589–91 (describing the Postema 
decision as only applying the exemption to the League structure and reserve system). 
 84. Grow, supra note 10, at 589–91. 
 85. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 86. Id. at 422–23. 
2013] Blackout or Blackmail? 167 
sale, claiming that there were concerns about the financial backgrounds 
of the businessmen, and sold the team instead for $100 million to 
another investor who agreed to keep the team in San Francisco.87 Among 
the many claims brought by the plaintiffs was a claim of violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act based on the League’s “direct and indirect 
restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of, and competition 
for such teams.”88 The League moved to dismiss the suit because of their 
antitrust exemption under Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood.89 The 
court, however, denied the League’s motion on the grounds that the 
Supreme Court precedent on baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited 
to cases that dealt with the reserve clause.90 
The Piazza court was not alone in holding that the exemption was 
limited to the reserve clause.91 Over the next two years, Florida state 
courts reached similar decisions on the same issue discussed in Piazza 
regarding the relocation of a franchise to Tampa Bay.92 In the 1994 case 
Butterworth v. National League, the Florida Supreme Court not only 
reached the same decision but was extremely clear in doing so, stating 
specifically, “[W]e find that baseball’s antitrust exemption extends only 
to the reserve system.”93 One year later, in Morsani v. MLB, plaintiffs 
filed an antitrust suit against the League for again thwarting their plans 
to have a baseball franchise in Tampa Bay.94 Here, the court upheld the 
Butterworth decision and also ruled that the antitrust exemption was 
limited to the reserve clause.95 
What is clear, however, is that, consistent with the standard 
articulated in Henderson Broadcasting, federal courts have not applied 
the baseball exemption to cases involving baseball entities and licensing 
with third parties. In 1972, the Northern District of California applied 
federal antitrust law to assess a contract between the Oakland Athletics 
and a concessions company.96 In 1981, about one year before Henderson 
Broadcasting, the Third Circuit applied antitrust law to a suit regarding 
                                                                                                                                       
 87. Id. The League expressed concerns about “out-of-state money” and that the 
“‘Pennsylvania People’ had ‘dropped out.’” Id. at 422. The two plaintiffs, Vincent Piazza 
and Vincent Tirendi, were the only investors from Pennsylvania, and they believed that the 
League’s comments, along with the fact that they were both of Italian descent, gave the 
implication that they had some association with organized crime. Id. at 422–23. 
 88. Id. at 424. 
 89. Id. at 433. 
 90. Id. at 438; cf. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).  
 91. Grow, supra note 10, at 585–89. 
 92. Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 
1994). 
 93. Id. at 1022. 
 94. Morsani v. MLB, 663 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 95. Id. at 655. 
 96. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 
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licensing agreements between the players’ union and a baseball card 
manufacturer.97 Three years later, the Eastern District of New York 
applied antitrust law to evaluate a broadcast licensing contract between 
Cablevision and the two New York professional baseball teams (as well 
as other New York professional sports teams), eventually dismissing the 
claims because the plaintiff (a competing cable company) failed to show 
injury as a result of these agreements.98 In a more recent decision, the 
Second Circuit evaluated the case MLB Properties v. Salvino, where a 
stuffed animal manufacturer brought an antitrust suit against the League 
in response to a cease-and-desist letter for the unlicensed use of MLB 
Club logos.99 The League did not even raise the antitrust exemption as a 
defense, instead moving for judgment on the merits to avoid having the 
exemption reviewed in court and running the risk of losing it 
altogether.100 
In contrast, federal courts have readily applied the antitrust 
exemption in cases that fall more squarely within the “business of 
baseball,” such as those involving league structure and relocation of 
franchises. In 1974, citing Flood, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower 
court’s dismissal of an antitrust claim against the League by the owner 
of a minor league team in Portland who wanted compensation for the 
League’s expansion into the team’s exclusive territory.101 In 1982, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the League’s player assignment and franchise 
location system “plainly concerns matters that are an integral part of the 
business of baseball” and upheld the exemption.102 Two subsequent 
federal court decisions regarding franchise relocation, New Orleans 
Pelicans Baseball v. National Ass’n of Professional Baseball Leagues 
and MLB v. Crist, also upheld the exemption on the same grounds.103 
Most recently, in City of San José v. Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball, an antitrust claim was brought against the League for rejecting 
relocation of the Oakland Athletics to San José, California.104 Although 
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Judge Whyte admitted that “[t]he exemption is an ‘aberration’ that 
makes little sense given the heavily interstate nature of the ‘business of 
baseball’ today,” he still dismissed the antitrust claim, holding that 
“[t]he alleged interference with a baseball club’s relocation efforts 
presents an issue of league structure that is ‘integral’ to the business of 
baseball, and thus falls squarely within the exemption.”105 The court’s 
decision in Piazza, the only franchise location case in which the 
exemption was not upheld, was explicitly rejected in both the New 
Orleans Pelicans and San José decisions.106 
C. 2010: AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL 
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in American 
Needle v. NFL that could put baseball’s unique antitrust position in 
jeopardy.107 The dispute arose when National Football League Properties 
(NFLP)—the organization formed by teams in the National Football 
League (NFL) to market and license their intellectual property and 
merchandise—granted an exclusive ten-year license to Reebok to 
“manufacture and sell trademarked headwear for all 32 teams.”108 
American Needle, a headwear manufacturer, designer, and dealer,109 
enjoyed the benefit of a non-exclusive license with the NFL until 
2000.110 That year, the company filed a suit against the NFL, its member 
teams, NFLP, and Reebok for violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act111 because the license to Reebok effectively shut down this portion 
of their business.112  
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In defending its actions, the NFL relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.113 and argued 
that because the thirty-two individual NFL teams acted as a single entity 
for the same common interests of the whole league, they were therefore 
unable to violate antitrust laws.114 The basis of this argument arose from 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in the case North 
American Soccer League v. NFL, arguing that sports leagues do not 
compete with themselves and instead compete with “other forms of 
entertainment.”115 This framework was picked up by the Seventh Circuit 
decision, Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, holding 
that sports leagues operate as a single entity because of the need to 
cooperate in the competition and scheduling of games.116 
After the lower courts accepted this argument,117 American Needle 
appealed the case to the Supreme Court, sought a reversal of the lower 
courts’ decisions, and petitioned the Court to hold that antitrust law 
applies to all concerted actions of the NFL’s teams rather than just 
licensing agreements.118 The respondents—as well as the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL)—
welcomed this petition, since prevailing in the suit would have allowed 
the NFL to act as a single entity and be exempt from antitrust laws in all 
of its actions.119 
In the end, American Needle succeeded in their suit, but the 
Supreme Court’s unanimous decision did not broaden its holding in 
accordance with the requests of the parties in their respective appeals.120 
First, the Court rejected the NFL’s single entity argument from 
Copperweld Corp. and held that 
[t]he NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking 
quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of 
independent action. Each of the teams is a substantial, independently 
owned, and independently managed business . . . . The teams compete 
with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for 
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gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing 
personnel.121 
Second, the Court rejected the argument that there was no antitrust 
violation because the teams granted the exclusive license under the 
legally separate entity of NFLP, opining that an organization cannot 
evade antitrust law by simply operating under a different name.122 The 
third argument put forth by the NFL stated that it operated as a joint 
venture, since no team could fully operate without cooperation with the 
other teams in the league.123 The Court quickly dispatched this argument 
because although “participation of others is necessary” in a joint 
venture, parties’ actions can still violate section 1 of the Sherman Act 
when their interests in a joint venture differ from the interests of the firm 
as a whole.124 
The limitations in the Supreme Court’s opinion—in opposition to 
the broad arguments put forth by the parties—are particularly relevant in 
this third point. The Court held that the exclusive licensing of 
intellectual property at issue in this case constituted illegal concerted 
activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act.125 However, it also 
conceded parts of the NFL’s argument that, in order for it to be 
economically successful, teams need to cooperate without being 
“trapped by antitrust law.”126 The Court went on to say that “the interest 
in maintaining a competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate 
and important,”127 and as such it is necessary to have cooperation 
between teams in some areas—including production and scheduling of 
games—in order for the NFL to operate effectively.128 Although this 
may suggest that sports leagues and teams can engage in some collective 
decisions in order for the league as a whole to be successful and 
profitable, the Court did not indicate, other than the two limited areas of 
production and scheduling of games that were specifically mentioned,129 
where sports leagues and teams could cooperate without regard to 
antitrust laws. 
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II. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S BROADCASTING POLICIES 
The current broadcasting procedures of the League are as intricate 
and confusing as they are archaic.130 To fully understand the issue at the 
heart of Garber, it is also necessary to break down MLB’s different 
broadcasting concepts regarding team territorial rights, in-market games, 
out-of-market games, and blackout agreements. 
A. TEAM TERRITORIAL RIGHTS 
The anticompetitive broadcasting policies alleged by the plaintiffs in 
Garber are manifested through both cable and Internet broadcasts by 
using the League’s “demarcated territories.”131 The League developed 
these territorial-rights rules over forty years ago in order to protect a 
team’s marketing area, and they were based on the purported local fan 
base for each MLB team.132 For example, most of New England is 
currently listed in the Boston Red Sox market, and much of the Pacific 
Northwest is part of the Seattle Mariners market.133 
Each of these territories is used to determine what games are 
designated as “in-market” or “out-of-market” broadcasts based on what 
team is playing and where the consumer is located.134 A fan who lives in 
Seattle and is trying to watch the Mariners—regardless of whether they 
were actually playing in Seattle or in some other city—would be in-
market.135 However that same fan would be out-of-market if he tried to 
watch the San Francisco Giants play the Los Angeles Dodgers.136 
Although some territories are only claimed by one MLB team, there is a 
great deal of overlap—some territories have up to six teams that are in-
market.137 Both in-market and out-of-market games, as well as the fans 
who watch them, are affected by the anticompetitive broadcasting 
practices that MLB employs.138 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Garber 
address both types of baseball broadcasts in their complaint.139 
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B. IN-MARKET BROADCASTING 
First, the Garber complaint discusses the anticompetitive exclusive 
license agreements for in-market broadcasts.140 For most in-market 
games, MLB teams enter into exclusive broadcasting agreements with 
Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) such as Comcast Sportsnet Chicago, 
which broadcasts White Sox and Cubs games, or Yankees Entertainment 
and Sports (YES) Networks, which broadcasts Yankees games.141 These 
exclusive agreements are meant to “divide the market geographically, 
permitting only the video presentations of a local team’s television 
partner to be shown in that team’s ‘exclusive territory.’”142 In doing so, 
these RSNs have the exclusive right to broadcast games in their 
designated territory and do not have to be concerned with other 
broadcasting networks encroaching on their target audience.143 As a 
result, consumers who are in-market do not have access to games 
broadcast by the RSN of another territory and need to purchase out-of-
market packages in order to watch these games.144 
C. OUT-OF-MARKET BROADCASTING 
The second aspect of the League’s noncompetitive policies that are 
alleged by the Garber plaintiffs surrounds the broadcasting of out-of-
market live baseball games.145 As discussed above, the RSNs carry only 
the local teams that are included within their territorial areas and agree 
with other sports networks not to broadcast games of other teams.146 
Therefore, consumers who are out-of-market and wish to watch their 
favorite teams—with a few exceptions—are required to purchase 
specific “out-of-market packages.”147 
Currently, there are only two such packages available, both of which 
are controlled by the League.148 The first offers a paid subscription to 
MLB.tv that is streamed on the Internet and provided directly from the 
League.149 For the 2013 season, a subscription to the MLB.tv Premium 
package cost $129.99 for the year, while the basic MLB.tv package cost 
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$109.99 yearly.150 However, the League requires customers to purchase 
a premium MLB.tv subscription, instead of the basic package, in order 
to watch live games on mobile devices.151 The second option is the MLB 
Extra Innings package, a premium television subscription offered only 
through cable and satellite distributors.152 In 2013, DirectTV offered the 
MLB Extra Innings package for a fee of $139.96 per half season, 
amounting to $279.92 for the full season.153 
Yet, despite advertisements that claim out-of-market packages offer 
“every game . . . everywhere,”154 or “your season ticket to every MLB 
game,”155 these subscriptions are subject to blackout restrictions that 
prevent customers from watching certain games.156 The blackout 
agreements take two different forms: national and territorial 
blackouts.157 National blackouts prevent MLB.tv and MLB Extra Innings 
customers from watching games where the League has licensed 
exclusive broadcasting rights to national networks, such as the 
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) and Fox.158 
National broadcasting blackouts occur for any Saturday game starting 
within three hours before or after a nationally broadcasted game on Fox, 
any Sunday games beginning after 5:00 PM EST, as well as any other 
games broadcast on national networks, such as the All-Star Game and 
postseason games.159 However, an Internet subscription for postseason 
games (with the exception of the World Series and National League 
Championship Series) is available from the League’s postseason.tv 
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package for a fee of $4.99 for customers in the United States and Canada 
and $24.99 for all other customers.160 
Territorial blackouts are more common and are based on the 
territorial rights restrictions for RSNs.161 For these types of restrictions, 
“live games will be blacked out in each applicable Club’s home 
television territory, regardless of whether that Club is playing at home or 
away.”162 This means that, using the same hypothetical fan from Seattle, 
he or she could watch any televised baseball game, so long as the Seattle 
Mariners are not one of the teams playing, regardless of where the game 
is held.163 For these games, fans have to subscribe to in-market packages 
through their local cable provider to watch the game on the local 
RSNs.164 
III. THE CASE FOR GARBER V. MLB 
Against this backdrop of baseball’s antitrust exemption and the 
League’s complex broadcasting policies, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York will consider Garber v. MLB.165 The 
complaint was filed as a class action by two different classes of 
plaintiffs, both of which were allegedly charged supra-competitive 
prices and encountered unreasonable blackout restrictions because of 
baseball’s antitrust exemption: (1) a television class for those who 
purchased a cable package through Comcast, DirectTV, or their 
subsidiaries in order to watch live baseball games within the past four 
years and (2) an Internet class who purchased a subscription to watch 
live games through MLB.tv within the past four years.166 
The four plaintiffs in the case who represent these two different 
classes brought antitrust actions for anticompetitive broadcasting 
practices under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against the 
Commissioner of Baseball, the League itself, nine of the thirty 
individual baseball teams,167 and several broadcasting companies, 
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including Comcast, DirectTV, Fox Sports Net, Turner Broadcast System 
(TBS), and ESPN.168 The Sherman Act makes unlawful “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations.”169 The Garber complaint alleges that the broadcasting 
agreements of the League are in violation of the Act because of the 
League’s anticompetitive agreements, blackout policies, and supra-
competitive prices.170 In pursuing this action, the plaintiffs hope to 
receive damages and injunctive relief in order to reclaim the excessive 
costs of purchasing cable and Internet broadcasting packages, as well as 
prevent the defendants from furthering any anticompetitive broadcasting 
policies.171 
On December 5, 2012, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin rejected 
the League’s motion to dismiss against the Garber plaintiffs, stating that 
the plaintiffs have “plausibly alleged” that they have been harmed by the 
League’s anticompetitive broadcasting policies.172 In the opinion, Judge 
Scheindlin held that “[m]aking all games available as part of a package, 
while it may increase output overall, does not, as a matter of law, 
eliminate the harm to competition wrought by preventing the individual 
teams from competing to sell their games outside their home territories 
in the first place.”173 
The Southern District of New York should ultimately rule in favor 
of the plaintiffs in deciding this case for two reasons. First, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle, baseball’s antitrust 
exemption should no longer apply or should be narrowed such that it 
does not include broadcasting of professional baseball games.174 Second, 
the League’s broadcasting procedures unreasonably restrain trade in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.175 As a result of these 
anticompetitive actions, consumers and fans of baseball pay supra-
competitive prices for cable and Internet subscriptions, undergo unfair 
blackout policies, and subscribe to excessive amounts of broadcasts in 
order to watch their favorite in-market and out-of-market teams. 
Accordingly, the League should discontinue anticompetitive 
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broadcasting policies and allow fans to subscribe to more targeted 
viewing packages for the mutual benefit of fans and MLB. 
A. REMOVAL OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AFTER 
AMERICAN NEEDLE 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the NFL’s single entity defense in 
American Needle has put the antitrust exemption of professional 
baseball in jeopardy and is likely one reason why, “according to a 
number of sources, the league is taking [the Garber case] very 
seriously.”176 The antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball was twice 
upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of stare decisis.177 Although 
the Court’s decision in American Needle did not involve baseball, its 
holding does prevent future courts from simply hanging their hat on 
stare decisis when reviewing challenges to the League’s antitrust 
exemption. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s holding that baseball did 
not constitute interstate commerce, which created the exemption in the 
first place, is no longer true—it can be argued it never was—as the 
Court admitted in Flood.178 
This is not to say that the League should be prevented from engaging 
in anticompetitive measures entirely. Indeed, the Court conceded in 
American Needle that sports leagues are allowed some degree of 
cooperation with one another in order to schedule and hold games.179 
However, in terms of licensing, a court presumably would not be so 
lenient. In fact, the League likely assumed this would be the case when 
it refused to raise the exemption as a defense in the Salvino case.180 Any 
licensing case reviewing the exemption following American Needle 
would almost certainly pose an even greater risk to the exemption’s 
removal. As Judge Scheindlin noted in her opinion rejecting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, “[t]he fact that the NHL and MLB are 
lawful joint ventures does not preclude plaintiffs from challenging the 
Leagues’ particular policies under the rule of reason . . . . American 
Needle conclusively established that these kinds of arrangements are 
subject to Section 1 scrutiny.”181 Thus, the methodology in American 
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Needle for applying antitrust law to licensing of merchandise serves as a 
strong precedent to eliminate baseball’s antitrust exemption by applying 
the Sherman Act to the licensing of baseball broadcasts as well. 
B. NON-COMPETITIVE BROADCASTING AGREEMENTS AND 
BLACKOUT POLICIES 
Without professional baseball’s long-standing shield from federal 
antitrust law, the Southern District of New York should agree with the 
plaintiffs in Garber and find that the League’s various broadcasting 
agreements unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 
The complaint in Garber first examines the exclusive broadcasting 
agreements between the League’s member clubs and local RSNs for in-
market live game broadcasts.182 These exclusive broadcasting contracts 
bring in billions of dollars of revenue for MLB teams,183 and they are 
now worth more to these teams than any other source of revenue, 
including ticket sales, merchandising, and sponsorships.184 
For the RSNs, broadcasting agreements are especially valuable 
because sports are arguably “DVR-proof.”185 In today’s world, many 
people record live TV and fast-forward through the commercials or 
watch prerecorded streaming video online.186 However, live sporting 
events are one of the last television programs to be considered “DVR-
proof” because audiences still feel the need to watch the events as they 
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happen.187 As stated by John Skipper, programming chief at ESPN, “It’s 
exclusive, one of a kind, and it works for us on every level.”188 
Therefore, live sporting events are much less affected by technological 
innovations that allow viewers to avoid watching commercials, and 
television networks can charge higher prices to advertisers.189 
Additionally, these high profits are not limited to just the MLB teams 
and local RSNs, since some games are also broadcast through national 
agreements between the League and national broadcasters, including 
ESPN, Fox, and TBS.190 MLB teams and the League are making 
millions and billions of dollars in revenue from the RSNs and national 
networks, which in turn are earning huge profits from advertising 
revenues—and these contracts continue to skyrocket.191 At the MIT 
Sloan Sports Analytics Conference held in 2012, a panel of sports 
programming chiefs from ESPN, Fox, and NBC, as well as league media 
heads from the NFL and MLB, all agreed that “sports media rights are 
rich and getting richer” and “despite some occasional haggling over 
game packages . . . , things are working for everyone.”192 
So in the end, everyone benefits—except for the fans. While the 
revenues of the League and the broadcasting networks continue to 
increase, all of the rising costs are passed directly to the fans, who pay 
higher prices on their bills when subscribing to cable providers.193 In 
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fact, some commentators believe that “American television subscribers 
pay, on average, about $100 a year for sports programming—no matter 
how many games they watch.”194 Other media analysts have explained 
that sports programming only makes up about twenty percent of the 
television viewing for an average household, but it represents about fifty 
percent of the costs for cable or satellite television subscriptions.195 
Unfairly high subscription fees resulting from restraining trade are 
not limited to just in-market packages, as the League can “exploit their 
illegal monopoly by charging supra-competitive prices” for the out-of-
market Internet and premium cable packages as well.196 Due to the 
League’s exemption from antitrust laws and “the clubs’ horizontal 
elimination of competition,” the same anticompetitive pricing that fans 
are subjected to for in-market baseball broadcasts through subscriptions 
to local cable providers also apply to how the League can set prices for 
the Internet and premium cable packages for out-of-market 
broadcasts.197 In just the short period of time since the filing of the 
Garber lawsuit, the yearly price of the out-of-market packages has 
increased by ten percent or more.198 Furthermore, both the MLB.tv and 
MLB Extra Innings packages are offered on an “all-or-nothing” basis, 
meaning that “[p]urchasers of MLB.TV must buy all out-of-market 
games for all teams even if they are only interested in watching the 
games of a particular team.”199 And because both MLB.tv and MLB 
Extra Innings are licensed directly from the League, subscription fees 
paid by customers are funneled directly into the coffers of the League 
and its thirty teams.200 
Yet, “[a]t the core of Defendants’ restraint of competition in the 
video programming market are the regional blackout agreements.”201 
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This is because in many situations, fans who attempt to watch live 
baseball broadcasts are unable to avoid paying for the supra-competitive 
local television subscriptions due to the League’s blackout 
restrictions.202 Because the MLB teams and the League are able to enter 
into exclusive contracts with local and national television networks 
based on territorial broadcasting rights, fans who wish to watch live 
games are often required to purchase cable subscriptions at the supra-
competitive prices and purchase out-of-market sports packages, rather 
than having access to games directly from the teams.203 
The problem with these blackout policies is twofold. Baseball fans 
who want to watch both in-market and out-of-market games are forced 
to purchase both out-of-market packages and local cable subscriptions in 
order to watch these games.204 As a result, fans that are already paying 
upwards of $109 for out-of-market packages from the League are now 
required to also purchase cable subscriptions at their supra-competitive 
rates in order to watch in-market games.205 As troubling as this double-
dipping by the League may be for fans, the situation is even direr for 
baseball fans in other market areas. In those areas where a fan is 
technically within a team’s broadcasting territory but their local RSN 
does not subscribe to that team’s games, even buying the in-market 
package would not give access to that team’s games.206 For example, the 
territory-rights of much of central and western North Carolina have the 
Cincinnati Reds listed as one of their in-market teams.207 However, not 
only do cable companies in North Carolina have no incentive to carry 
Fox Sports Ohio (the Reds’ RSN), but that area is already covered by 
Fox Sports Carolinas, which does not broadcast Reds games.208 Thus, a 
Reds fan living in Charlotte would have no possible way of watching 
live games without making the over seven-hour, 477-mile trip to the 
Great American Ball Park in Cincinnati.209 Additionally, nationally 
televised games—some weekend games, the All-Star Game, and all of 
the playoffs—are also blacked out for MLB.tv or MLB Extra Innings 
subscribers.210 
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The second and most troublesome problem with the League’s 
blackout policies relates to how many of the demarcated broadcasting 
territories overlap one other. Although some territories only have one 
team, other territories that do not have a local team and are 
geographically in-between different teams’ local markets—such as the 
entire state of Iowa and the greater Las Vegas area—have as many as six 
teams claiming in-market broadcasting rights.211 Outside of the 
contiguous United States, the blackout policies are even broader; the 
entire Canadian market is blacked out from Toronto Blue Jays games (in 
addition to other teams in certain areas), and the U.S. territories of 
Guam and the Virgin Islands are blacked out from every game.212 
Additionally, because the blackouts are enforced “regardless of whether 
that Club is playing at home or away,”213 fans in a market like Las 
Vegas, which has six different teams claiming territorial rights, can have 
up to twelve different teams that are blacked out on any given day.  
Based on this information, both the non-competitive agreements and 
the blackout policies in the way the League broadcasts games restrain 
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Yet, even with a removal of 
baseball’s preferred antitrust status, the Garber plaintiffs must still 
overcome the hurdle of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (the 
SBA).214 The SBA, passed in 1961 to facilitate an agreement where the 
NFL would sell a package of games to CBS, provides that 
antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among 
persons . . . conducting the organized professional team sports of 
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs 
participating in [these sports] sells or otherwise transfers all or any part 
of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored 
telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as 
the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.215 
Yet, there are two specific reasons why the SBA should not be 
applied here. The first comes from the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
sports broadcasting in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma.216 In this decision, the Court stated that, for broadcasts, 
“[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and 
both are unresponsive to consumer preference. This latter point is 
perhaps the most significant, since Congress designed the Sherman Act 
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as a consumer welfare prescription.”217 Thus, to meet this “Rule of 
Reason” standard, the Garber plaintiffs would have to prove that the 
price of broadcasting is higher on consumers and the output of games is 
“lower than it would otherwise be.”218 As previously described, the 
skyrocketing broadcasting contracts that are passed on to consumers, as 
well as those consumers who are blacked out from watching games 
entirely, would easily meet this standard.  
In the NCAA case, however, the Supreme Court did not consider the 
SBA at all because it only applies to professional sports. The Seventh 
Circuit considered the SBA in the 1992 case Chicago Professional 
Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA.219 In this case, the Chicago Bulls filed 
an antitrust suit against the NBA because of a rule limiting the number 
of games that individual teams could license to network 
“superstations.”220 The court held that the SBA only applies “when the 
league has transferred a right to sponsored telecasting,” and the NBA’s 
national broadcasting contracts did not give a “right to limit 
broadcasting of other contests.”221 Another federal court reviewing the 
SBA specifically held that “‘[s]ponsored telecasting’ under the SBA 
pertains only to network broadcast television and does not apply to non-
exempt channels of distribution such as cable television, pay-per-view, 
and satellite television networks.”222 Judge Scheindlin’s opinion of the 
Garber case also addressed this point, stating that the rule of reason 
“does not give league agreements regarding television rights blanket 
immunity from antitrust scrutiny” and “may constitute an antitrust 
violation.”223 
Therefore, in light of these interpretations of the SBA’s scope, as 
well as the “Rule of Reason” standard from NCAA, the Southern District 
of New York should not apply the SBA to the anticompetitive 
broadcasting agreements at issue here. Any court reviewing a challenge 
to the exemption must consider that “[a]ntitrust law is concerned with 
the market, and hence, the needs of the consumers. The final decision, 
then, should be more about protecting the rights of another stakeholder, 
the fans of baseball.”224 Accordingly, the court should find in favor of 
the Garber plaintiffs, and hold that the League does not have an 
exemption from antitrust law and conspired to restrict trade in violation 
of the Sherman Act. 
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE BROADCASTING PROCEDURES 
This Note has highlighted why the Southern District of New York 
should rule in favor of the Garber plaintiffs and hold that (1) baseball no 
longer enjoys the status of being exempt from antitrust law and (2) the 
broadcasting policies of the League unreasonably restrain trade in 
violation of the Sherman Act. If the court does rule in favor of the 
plaintiffs, it would no doubt be a huge blow to the League going 
forward. However, no matter what the outcome of this case is, there are 
steps the League can take to change its anticompetitive policies for the 
mutual benefit of the League and its fans. 
Although there are some avid baseball fans who would watch any 
game being broadcast, arguably the vast majority of fans simply want to 
watch their favorite team.225 As a result, the solution that commentators 
suggest “makes so much sense it’ll never happen” is to offer “a-la-carte” 
pricing on games.226 Using this method, fans could have access to just 
the games they want by being able to purchase packages directly from 
their favorite teams. As Stephen Ross and Stefan Szymanksi write (who 
were also cited in the Garber complaint): 
Absent the exclusive territorial arrangements agreed to by league 
owners, individual teams would either directly, or more likely through 
intermediaries, arrange for their own games to be available to out-of-
market fans . . . . Fans wishing to see only their favorite team now pay 
for more games than they want, so sports leagues are currently using 
their monopoly power to effectuate a huge wealth transfer . . . . [L]ess 
fanatic consumers would be willing to pay a more modest sum for their 
favorite teams’ games only. As to these fans, the current scheme 
reduces output.227 
Thus, while broadcasting packages may bring in less revenue on an 
individual basis, the League would increase output to many more fans 
by offering them the ability to see the games they want, and this increase 
in viewership could compensate for lower per capita revenues. 
Additionally, there is nothing keeping the League from providing 
this system to fans because the technology is already available.228 
Through MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM), the League has the ability 
to stream every live baseball game through the Internet on virtually any 
device, and MLBAM is already used to show games through the MLB.tv 
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package.229 If fans were allowed to purchase packages directly from the 
teams they want to watch, the League could make every game available 
through MLBAM. 
Lastly, as stated in the American Needle opinion, “the interest in 
maintaining a competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate 
and important.”230 If live games were offered on an individual basis, it 
would aid in the competitive balance of the League and make games 
more interesting to watch.231 As previously mentioned, the vast majority 
of teams’ revenues come from the massive local television contracts that 
are arranged with RSNs.232 Because of this, teams that play in larger 
television markets, such as Los Angeles or New York, can reach 
agreements for massive television deals and afford to have more elite 
players.233 On the other hand, MLBAM is equally owned by all thirty of 
the League’s member clubs,234 and every dollar that goes through the 
company is distributed evenly.235 Thus, by circumventing the need to go 
through RSNs entirely, each team would receive an equal share of the 
broadcasting revenue and not be concerned with the size of the 
television market where that team is located. In turn, cable companies 
would not have to be locked into huge contracts with RSNs, where the 
high costs are passed on to consumers who may not even watch baseball 
at all.236 
CONCLUSION 
In this lawsuit, the Garber plaintiffs have the chance to make history 
and bring about significant changes that would improve baseball for 
years to come. As stated most poignantly by Yahoo! Sports writer Jeff 
Passan: 
Garber et al v. MLB is the workaround code for the working person. It 
is the suit behind which every baseball fan should stand. It’s 2012, 
where everything is available everywhere, and pure greed is keeping 
baseball off our TVs, our tablets, our laptops and our phones. If 
baseball refuses to budge on an issue so archaic, so absurd and so 
blatant in its indifference toward people who want to buy one of their 
products, the league should suffer through the embarrassment of 
getting clowned by the fans whom it clowns with black TV screens. It 
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may move slowly – most antitrust lawsuits do—but if this succeeds, it 
will be a decades-forward leap in one fell swoop.237 
Garber v. MLB is the chance for the League to finally reexamine 
their antiquated broadcasting policies and develop a new strategy that 
works for an increasingly technological and international new generation 
of baseball fans. No matter the outcome of the case, MLB has the 
opportunity to make ground-breaking modernizations that would shake 
up the sports world and solidify its namesake as the “national pastime” 
for decades to come. 
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